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  S A R A J E V O

  A STUD Y IN THE ORIGINS OF THE GREA Τ WAR

  By R. W. SETON-WATSON

  D.Litt. (Oxon), Hon. Ph.D. (Prague and Zagreb);

  Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London;

  Hon. Member of the Roumanian Academy

  LONDON:

  HUTCHINSON & CO. (Publishers), LTD.

  PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C.

  Made and Printed in Great Britain by

  The Camelot Press Limited,

  London and Southampton

  TO

  MY WIFE

  AS A MEMORY OF

  FOUR JUGOSLAV JOURNEYS

  TOGETHER

  (1912, 1913, 1920, 1925.)

  SARAJEVO

  (A SERB FOLKSONG)

  Sarajevo, whence comes thy gloom?

  Tell me, has fire consumed thee?

  Or has the flood engulfed thy streets?

  Or has the plague laid hold on thee?

  Softly Sarajevo gives answer:

  " Had fire consumed me so sore,

  My shining courts would rise again.

  Had the fierce flood engulfed my streets,

  My markets would be cleansed and fresh.

  But plague has laid her murderous hand,

  Her murderous hand on young and old,

  And those I love has torn apart."

  PREFACE

  MUCH has been written on the immediate origins of the

  Great War and the complicated diplomatic conflict which

  preceded actual hostilities;

  but till very recently the

  Balkan aspect of the question has not received the

  attention which it deserves. The two most authoritative

  surveys in English — Mr. Headlam-Morley's The History

  of Twelve Days (1915) and Sir Charles Oman's The

  Outbreak of the War (1918) — are now both out of date,

  owing to the subsequent publication of the German and

  Austrian diplomatic documents, and of much supple-

  mentary material of a less official character. Thus there

  is great need of a book summarising all the latest evidence

  on a question which is of burning importance in the

  Europe of to-day.

  The original German theory, which made of Britain

  and of Sir Edward Grey the villains of the piece, has

  long since been exploded, and, for the time at least,

  abandoned even in Germany itself: nor is it ever likely

  to convince any person who, with open mind, reads that

  statesman's newly published memoirs. The attack was

  then transferred to Russia, and the alleged methods by

  which a general mobilisation was carried out behind the

  back of the Tsar were treated as responsible for the

  final catastrophe. The superficiality of this argument

  was from the first apparent to all save the wilfully blind,

  and was finally demonstrated by the critical study of

  General Dobrorolski and other publications. The most

  recent tendency has been to shift the main responsibility

  on to the shoulders of Serbia; and it therefore becomes

  all the more necessary to place the Serbian side of the

  problem in the forefront of discussion, instead of treating

  8

  it as a mere accessory to general diplomatic history and

  thereby missing the true significance of events.

  The present volume, then, is an attempt to subject

  much new and hitherto undigested material to a critical

  and detailed analysis, and to place in their proper Euro-

  pean perspective both the Austro-Serbian quarrel and

  the crime of Sarajevo which resulted from it. I found

  myself almost involuntarily driven to the attempt, while

  engaged upon a larger work which traces the Jugoslav

  national movement from its origins to the achievement

  of unity and independence. It soon became obvious

  that to treat the crisis of 1914 in that detail which alone

  could ensure fairness and make it comprehensible would

  utterly destroy the proportions of the proposed book,

  and I therefore decided to detach it from the main

  narrative and present it to the public in a form which

  would leave freer play to the argument. During a long

  visit to Jugoslavia last spring I was able to obtain much

  additional

  information

  from

  first-hand

  sources,

  and

  especially from the survivors of the revolutionary move-

  ment inside the Dual Monarchy, whose spontaneous

  nature has been too often overlooked.

  It is hardly too much to assert that one prime cause

  of the disaster which befell Europe was the failure of her

  leading statesmen to estimate truly the forces at work

  in what was called the " Eastern " or " Balkan " Ques-

  tion.

  Without

  any

  accurate

  diagnosis

  there

  could

  obviously be no hope of applying an effective remedy;

  and hence the measures adopted between 1908 and 1914

  at best only postponed, and at worst actually aggravated,

  the malady. One fact which emerges from the following

  narrative is the superficial outlook of all the Powers

  towards a problem so full of explosive elements as the

  Southern Slav; and this may perhaps serve as a reminder

  that similar national problems subsist in an acute and

  unsolved form, even in post-war Europe, and deserve

  close and constant attention.

  9

  In this connection I desire to make quite clear the

  motives which prompted me to undertake this work.

  After seven years of confusion and recrimination Europe

  at last seems to be moving slowly in the direction of

  peace and conciliation; and there is a tendency in some

  quarters to regard the question of responsibility either

  as a mere irritant which should now be relegated to the

  background and replaced by the motto "Forget and

  forgive," or as an insidious excuse for re-opening problems

  which the war has solved. Both these views seem to

  me fundamentally false. The question of war guilt is

  likely to, and ought to, occupy some measure of the

  attention of all who wish to see the European Common-

  wealth placed on a sounder and safer basis; for it

  provides the main clues by which we may judge and

  compare the merits of the old system and the new. An

  honest investigation of the causes of the war, however

  severe the verdict to which it may lead, cannot properly

  be regarded as a vindictive act towards our former

  enemies; and I for one am perfectly prepared to co-

  operate with German no less than Allied students of

  the problem, with a view to the elucidation of the truth.

  The stronger our condemnation of the old forces and

  the old regime, the keener should be our desire to establish

  a common basis of outlook and of action with the

  new.

  A considerable portion of the present volume had

  already been completed when the publication of an

/>   amazing article by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic aroused acute

  controversy at home and abroad, and led to a determined

  attempt ta saddle Serbia with the main responsibility

  for the outbreak of the Great War. In chapter vi. I

  have tried to reduce this incident to its true-proportions,

  and. an appendix to the same chapter contains a summary

  of subsequent developments. The silence of Mr. PaSic

  and his Government — due apparently to intricate motives

  of internal party politics and to a singular indifference

  10

  to moral considerations — reflects great discredit upon

  them, and has gravely injured the reputation of their

  country abroad, but none the less it cannot affect the

  main issues involved.

  I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Headlam-

  Morley, who allowed me to read the advanced proofs

  of the complete edition of British Diplomatic Documents

  relating to the outbreak of the war, which he has pre-

  pared for publication and which is due to appear shortly.

  I was thus enabled to add valuable points of detail to

  my narrative, and above all to assure myself that nothing

  really material to the issue had been withheld by the

  British Government in August 1914. Much has been

  written for and against Lord Grey's policy, but even to

  this day he has never received full credit for the publica-

  tion of the frankest and fullest White Paper ever published

  in our history. The moral effect of that publication was

  simply incalculable, both at home and abroad; and the

  publication of the German, Austrian, and Russian docu-

  ments,

  and

  the

  British

  Government's

  decision

  last

  December to entrust Mr. Gooch and Mr. Temperley

  with a similar task, were, it seems to me, merely the

  logical consequence of Lord Grey's initiative in August

  1914 and of its decisive influence upon world opinion.

  R. W. SETON-WATSON.

  15 November, 1925.

  CONTENTS

  CHAPTER I. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONFLICT

  The

  Habsburg

  mission

  against

  the

  Turks–Serb

  reugeees

  in

  Hungary

  and

  Croatia-Byzantium

  and

  Rome-The

  Illyrian

  and

  Jugoslav

  ideas-Prince

  Michael-The

  Eastern

  crisis

  of

  1875-8

  and

  Austria-Hungary's

  occupation

  of

  Bosnia-Sebia

  under

  Milan

  and

  Alexander-Croatia

  under

  Khuen–The

  revival of 1903

  – The „Pig War” – The Serbo-Croat Coalition –

  Austro-Hungarian

  and

  Russian

  rivalry

  in

  the

  Balkans-

  Aehrenthal

  and

  Izvolsky-The

  annexation

  of

  Bosnia

  –

  The

  Zagreb

  and

  Friedjung

  Trials-William

  II

  „in

  shining

  armour”

  –

  The Southern Slav Question as an International issue …………………… 15

  CHAPTER II. THE BALKAN WARS

  The

  Bosnian

  Diet-Conrad

  and

  Italy-The

  Balkan

  League-

  The

  defeat

  of

  Turkey-Cuvaj's

  dictatorship

  m

  Croaüa-

  Tugoslav

  enthusiasm

  for

  the

  Balkan

  allies

  –

  The

  Prochaska

  Affair-Serbia's

  Adriatic

  claims-Conrad

  and

  the

  Southern

  Slavs-Berchtold

  and

  Masaryk-The

  Second

  Balkan

  War-

  The

  Treaty

  of

  Bucarest-Austria-Hungary

  held

  back

  by

  Italy

  and

  Germany-William

  II

  helps

  Kings

  Constantine

  and

  Charles

  —

  Berchtold,

  Conrad,

  and

  the

  war

  party

  in

  Vienna-Pasic

  s

  overtures

  rejected-Serbia

  and

  Russia-Balkan

  megalomania-

  Unrest in Bosnia and Croatia-Widespread conspiracy……………………….. 38

  CHAPTER III. THE JUGOSLAV REVOLUTIONARY

  MOVEMENT

  Serbian

  sentiment

  for

  Bosnia-Kallay's

  warnings

  to

  Vienna-

  The

  revolutionary

  tradition

  —

  The

  new

  generation

  —

  Student

  journals

  —

  Kocic

  and Radulovic

  —

  Zerajic's attempt on the

  Governor

  –

  The

  Death

  of

  a

  Hero

  and

  its

  influence-The

  spread

  of

  terrorist

  ideas-Agitation

  in

  the

  schools-Gacinovic

  and

  his group

  —

  Constant demonstrations and terrorist talk

  —

  The

  conspirators in Sarajevo ……………………………………………… 63

  12

  CHAPTER IV. THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND

  Character of the Archduke — Conflicts at Court — His desire for

  political changes — His hostility to Hungary — His foreign

  policy — His illness — William II and Francis Joseph — William

  II

  and

  Francis

  Ferdinand

  — Discussion of the Roumanian

  problem — Czernin's warnings — King Charles's alarm — The

  meeting of Konopiâtë — The growth of a legend……………………………

  80

  CHAPTER V. THE MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE

  The Bosnian manœuvres and Vidovdan — The murder — Inci-

  dents of the funeral — The lack of precautions in Sarajevo —

  General Potiorek — Outrages against the Serbs — The Wiesner

  enquiry — The Austro-Hungarian dossier against Serbia — Press

  polemics — The death of Hartwig………………………………………….. 101

  CHAPTER VI. THE RESPON
SIBILITY FOR THE CRIME

  Four

  possibilities

  —

  The

  Serbian

  Government

  absorbed

  in

  internal troubles — The problem of Montenegrin Union — Bel-

  grade's inaction — The "Narodna Odbrana" — The "Black

  Hand" — Colonel Dimitrijevic — Voja Tankosic — The Salonica

  Trial and its connection with Sarajevo — The real initiative —

  The Bosnian youth and their conspiracies — The reminiscences

  of Mr. Ljuba Jovanovié — Could Belgrade have warned Vienna?............ 129

  APPENDIX:

  The "Revelations" of Mr. Jovanovic………………………………………… 155

  CHAPTER VII. COUNT BERCHTOLD'S PREPARATIONS

  FOR WAR

  Berchtold's exposé of policy — Its revision after the murder —

  Tisza's memorandum to Francis Joseph — Obstacles to warlike

  action — Tisza's attitude — Berchtold and Berlin — The Hoyos

  mission — William II and Vienna — William II's marginalia —

  Berlin's

  encouragement

  of

  Vienna

  —

  The

  alleged

  "Crown

  Council" at Potsdam — The Joint Austro-Hungarian Council in

  Vienna (7 July) — The gradual conversion of Tisza — Berchtold

  and Tisza in agreement — Tschirschky keeps Berlin informed —

  Reasons

  for

  postponement

  — The Joint Council of July 19:

  final decisions…………………………………………………………………. 160

  CHAPTER VIII. THE DUPING OF EUROPE

  Conrad and Krobatin go on leave — Berlin's connivance.

  13

  BERCHTOLD

  AND

  ST.

  PETERSBURG:

  Sazonovś

  confidences

  Poincaré's

  visit-Szápáry's

  evasions-Berchtold

  misleads

  Kudashev — German views of Russian unpreparedness.

  BERCHTOLD AND PARIS:

  BERCHTOLD

  AND

  LONDON:

  Lützow's

  warning

  to

  de

  Bunsen